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Consider an exchange economy in which consumers have private information
at the interim stage when state contingent contracts are made. Each agent
knows her private information and has some probability assessment over the true
information of others. We study an environment in which the only constraints on
enforcing agreements are those arising from the incompleteness of information.
A coalition can agree on a feasible state contingent contract (or net-trades)
which is enforced by an agency using the private information reported by the
agents. Naturally then, contracts need to be subjected to incentive compatibility
constraints. An appropriate notion of the core provides a natural cooperative
equilibrium concept for the problem of resource allocation in such an economy.
One of the critical issues that arises in deﬁning an appropriate core notion - and
our central concern in the present paper - is the speciﬁcation of the information
that agents in a coalition are allowed to use in constructing an objection. In
what way, if any, can members of a coalition share their private information?
Put diﬀerently, over what kind of informational event is a coalition permitted to
object? It should be borne in mind that this issue does not arise in deﬁning the
core at the ex ante stage; see Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2000) for additional
discussion.
Wilson (1978), developed two distinct approaches that deal with this issue,
and lead respectively to the notions of the coarse core and the ﬁne core.1 The
coarse core is based on the assumption that a coalition can focus its potential
objection on an event if and only if the event is commonly known to all members
of the coalition. Thus the act of forming an objecting coalition does not change
the private information of any agent. The ﬁne core is based on the idea that
the act of forming a coalition allows all members of the coalition to decide how
much of their private information they wish to share with each other.
Thus, the coarse and the ﬁne core correspond to two extreme informational
assumptions on coalitional behavior - the former rules out information sharing
or leakage while the latter permits arbitrary sharing of information. We argue
that both of these polar cases are subject to criticism. In particular, we show by
means of an example that there may be circumstances in which it is reasonable
for coalitions to coordinate their actions on an event which is not a common
knowledge event. Another example demonstrates that the ﬁne core is also un-
reasonable since agents may not be able to pool their information in a credible
manner.
In viewof this discussion, it is natural to ask w hether the theory can provide
insights into the amount of private information that coalitions can be reasonably
expected to pool. In other words, is it possible to make endogenous the amount
of information that is pooled in a coalition? In this paper, we develop a notion
of the core in which coalitions are allowed to coordinate their actions over an
event that can be credibly inferred from the objection being contemplated. Our
1Wilson assumed that all information was publicly veriﬁable at the time of enforcement,
and hence did not have to impose incentive compatibility. Our primary concern here will be
with the incentive compatible versions of Wilson’s core notions.
1notion of credible objections is meant to capture the following idea. Suppose
a contract is under consideration as an objection by a coalition, and agent i in
the coalition claims that she is of type si. This claim is considered credible if
agent i would prefer the new contract to the status-quo if and only if she were
indeed of type si. Other agents should, therefore, be able to infer i’s statement
regarding the informational event.
The credible core is the set of allocations to which there is no credible ob-
jection.2 Although the credible core is a fairly conservative way of allowing
for endogenous information-sharing, we show, with an example, that it may be
empty (even if utility functions are linear).3 This reinforces Wilson’s (1978)
conclusion on the emptiness of the core. It appears that opening the door to
information-sharing even in a very restricted way is enough to destroy non-
emptiness of the core.
2 The Model
In this Section we describe the basic model of an exchange economy with incom-
plete information. Since our main interest lies in analyzing an environment in
which private information cannot be veriﬁed at the enforcement stage, we shall
impose incentive compatibility constraints on all contracts. For this reason, we
ﬁnd it convenient to formulate private information in terms of agents’ types.
Let Ti denote the (ﬁnite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation is that ti ∈
Ti denotes the private information possessed by agent i.W i t hN = {1,...,n} as
the ﬁnite set of agents, let T =
 
i∈N Ti. An information state for the economy
refers to t ∈ T. We will use the notation t−i to denote (t1,...,t i−1,t i+1,...t n}.
Similarly T−i =
 
j =i Tj, and for any coalition S, a non-empty subset of N,
tS =( ti)i∈S and TS =
 
i∈S Ti.
Each agent has a prior probability distribution qi deﬁned on T. We assume
that none of the types is redundant in the sense that for every i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ti,t h e r ee x i s t st−i ∈ T−i such that qi(t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and ¯ ti ∈ Ti,
the conditional probability of t−i ∈ T−i,g i v e n¯ ti is







We shall assume that all agents agree on zero probability events:
(A) If qi(t) > 0f o rs o m ei ∈ N and t ∈ T,t h e nqj(t) > 0 for all j ∈ N.
2The basic idea underlying the credible core has been used in a variety of diﬀerent con-
texts. See, for instance, Cho and Kreps (1987), Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983), Kahn and
Mookherjee (1995). For related work, see also Forges (1994), Krasa (2000), Ichiishi and Sertel
(1998) and Lee and Volij (1996).
3Wilson (1978) showed that the coarse core is non-empty in convex exchange economies
but that the ﬁne core may be empty. The incentive compatible coarse core is non-empty if
preferences are linear but may be empty otherwise; see Vohra (1999) and Forges, Mertens and
Vohra (2001).
2Let T ∗ = {t ∈ T | qi(t) > 0, for all i ∈ N}.A g e n ti of type t 
i ∈ Ti observes
the event Pi(t 
i)={t ∈ T ∗ | ti = t 
i}. In this way we can deﬁne for each
i a partition Pi = {Pi(ti)}ti∈Ti over T ∗ which represents the events that are
discernible by i.
We assume that there are a ﬁnite number of commodities, so that the con-
sumption set of any agent in any set is a subset of I R
l
+. The characteristics of an
agent, namely, the consumption set, the endowments and utility function will
depend in general on the state. We assume, for simplicity, that the endowment
of agent i is deﬁned by a function ωi : Ti  → I R
l,s ot h a tωi(ti) ∈ I R
l
+ denotes
i’s endowment when her type is ti. We also assume that Xi(t)=I R
l
+.E a c h
consumer has a state dependent utility function ui :I R
l × T  → I R. We will
denote by ui(.,t) the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of agent i in
state t. We assume that for each i ∈ N and t ∈ T, ui(.,t) is continuous and
concave.
We can nowdeﬁne an exchange economy as E = {(ui,X i,ω i,T i,q i)i∈N}.W e
shall assume:
(B) For all i ∈ N,t ∈ T and x ∈ I R
l
+, ui(x,t) ≥ ui(0,t).
A state contingent contract is a function x : T  →
 
i Xi. The set of contracts
feasible for the grand coalition is deﬁned as:









ωi(ti), for all t ∈ T}.





i∈S ωi(ti) for all t ∈ T.
(b) xi(t)=xi(t ) for all i ∈ S, t,t  ∈ T such that tS = t 
S.
Requirement (b) reﬂects the idea that a coalition cannot rely on the partic-
ipation of outsiders in choosing its mechanism. If information becomes publicly
veriﬁable at the enforcement stage there would be no reason to insist on (b).
The set of feasible contracts for coalition S is denoted AS.
2.1 The Coarse Core
Suppose agents in a coalition do not (or cannot) share their private informa-
tion. They can then coordinate their actions only over an event that is com-
monly known to them. A non-empty event E ⊆ T,i ss a i dt ob ediscernible
without information pooling by coalition S if qi(ˆ t−i | ti) = 0 (or, equivalently,
if qi(ˆ t−i,t i)=0 )f o ra l li ∈ S, t ∈ E and (ˆ t−i,t i) / ∈ E. S u c ha ne v e n ti sa l s o
termed a common knowledge event for coalition S.
For an event E ⊆ T, deﬁne for each i ∈ N,t h es e to ft y p e so fi compatible
with the event E as
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | (t 
−i,t i) ∈ E for some t 
−i ∈ T−i}.
3The conditional expected utility of consumer i corresponding to contract x,
conditional on her being of type ti,i s








Accordingly, y ∈ AS dominates x ∈ AN for S over a common knowledge
event E if
Ui(yi | ti) >U i(xi | ti) for all ti ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S,. (D )
In addition to physical feasibility and domination, we also need to impose
incentive compatibility constraints to ensure that an objecting contract can be
implemented by the coalition when private information cannot be veriﬁed.
Consider an allocation y. By pretending to be of type si, when her true type
is ti, agent i can obtain the net-trade corresponding to the state (t−i,s i)wh e n
the true state is t. Let the corresponding commodity bundle be denoted
yi(t−i,s i | ti)=yi(t−i,s i) − ωi(t−i,s i)+ωi(ti).
This deception yields conditional expected utility






−i,s i | ti),(t 
−i,t i)).
We shall assume that a deception that leads to bankruptcy can never be
proﬁtable. This is equivalent to extending the domain of the utility function
such that ui(yi,t)=−∞ for all yi / ∈ I R
l
+, for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T.
A contract y is said to be incentive compatible for coalition S if
Ui(yi | ti) ≥ Ui(yi,s i | ti) for all si,t i ∈ Ti, for all i ∈ S. (IC )
Coalition S has an incentive compatible, coarse objection to an incentive
compatible contract x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS a n da ne v e n tE that is
common knowledge for S such that (D’) and (IC’) hold.4 By the revelation
principle, the set of incentive compatible contracts is identical to those which
can be implemented as Bayesian Nash equilibria of a direct mechanism. A
contract can therefore be viewed as a mechanism. It is also worth pointing
out that in this context, the assumption of free disposal which we implicitly
made in deﬁning feasible allocations for a coalition is no longer innocuous. A
coalition may be able to do better if free disposal is allowed in the presence of
incentive constraints; see Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2001) and Forges, Minelli
and Vohra (2000) for examples. The results we report here, however, do not
rely on the free disposal assumption.
4One may argue that the incentive compatibility constraints as expressed in (IC’) are too
strong; it should be enough to require these constraints over the common knowledge event E.
Fortunately, as we will show in Proposition 2.1 below, this would not alter the notion of an
incentive compatible, coarse objection.
4The incentive compatible, coarse core consists of all incentive compatible
contracts x ∈ AN to which there exists no coarse objection.
2.2 The Fine Core
Suppose coalition S considers an event E ⊆ T over which to coordinate its
actions through a contract. The theory depends critically on the restrictions
that are imposed on such an event. There are some basic restrictions which
should always be imposed on such an event. Diﬀerences in various core notions
will then depend on additional restrictions that might be imposed. It turns
out that the basic restrictions we discuss below are already implicit in an event
which is commonly known to a coalition.5
To consider the possibility that a coalition may be able to act over an event
that is not necessarily commonly known to all members of the coalition, suppose
all members of coalition S believe that the true state belongs to a non-empty
set E ⊆ T. Clearly, there are some natural restrictions that ought to imposed
on E (if E is not a common knowledge event) for such beliefs to be reasonable.
First, it must be the case that E can be discerned without using the private
information of those not in the coalition. So, if S considers an event E then a
proﬁle of types of agents outside S, t 
−S ∈ T−S, can be excluded from E only if
this is discernible with the private information of agents in S.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c ea l l
our domination notions will be based on evaluating conditional utilities, we can
express this requirement as E = ES ×T−S. Second, E must reﬂect independent
claims by members of a coalition in a mechanism, i.e., E =[
 
i∈S Ei] × T−S,
where Ei ⊆ Ti for all i. Finally, E must be consistent with what each of the
agents in the coalition know, given their private information. No agent, knowing
her type, should rule out the possibility that the true state lies in E.I no t h e r
words, for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ei, qi(E | ti) > 0.
Thus, a non-empty event E ⊆ T is said to be admissible for coalition S if it




Ei × T−S, where Ei ⊆ Ti and qi(E | ti) > 0 for all t ∈ E, for all i ∈ S.
Suppose a coalition can act over an admissible event E. The notion of domi-
nation used in (D’) needs to be modiﬁed nowtaking account of the information
that is contained in E.
The probability that agent i assigns to t ∈ E, conditional on her type being











Note that if E is an admissible event, this expression is well-deﬁned since qi(E |
ti) > 0f o rt ∈ E. We can nowdeﬁne for each i ∈ S and a type ti ∈ Ei,t h e
5This will also make it clear that our deﬁnition of the incentive compatible, coarse core
above is the same as the deﬁnition used in Vohra (1999).
5conditional expected utility (conditional on E), for a contract x as






−i | ti,E)ui(xi(t 
−i,t i),(t 
−i,t i)).
For coalition S, y ∈ AS dominates x ∈ AN over an admissible event E if
Ui(yi | ti,E) >U i(xi | ti,E) for all ti ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S.( D )
If coalition S uses the information corresponding to an admissible event E,
we shall need to consider incentive compatibility with respect to E.G i v e n a
contract x a n da na d m i s s i b l ee v e n tE, the conditional expected utility (condi-
tional on the information provided by E) to agent i of type ti by pretending to
be of type si is deﬁned as






−i | ti,E)ui(x(t 
−i,s i | ti),(t 
−i,t i)).
A contract y is said to be incentive compatible over an admissible event E
for coalition S if
Ui(yi | ti,E) ≥ Ui(yi,s i | ti,E) for all si,t i ∈ Ei, for all i ∈ S. (IC)
Coalition S has an incentive compatible, ﬁne objection to an incentive com-
patible contract x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS and an admissible event E for S
such that (D) and (IC) hold.
The incentive compatible, ﬁne core consists of all incentive compatible con-
tracts x ∈ AN to which there exists no incentive compatible, ﬁne objection.
To clarify the essential diﬀerence between the coarse core and the ﬁne core it
is important to check that the domination and incentive compatibility conditions
are, in fact, the same in each case. Conditions (D) and (IC) in deﬁning a ﬁne
objection reﬂect the fact that agents update their prior probability assessments
based on the pooled information. No such updating is required in a coarse ob-
jection since no additional information becomes available to any agent through
the process of constructing an objection over a common knowledge event. It
can also be shown that imposing admissibility on a common knowledge event
would imply no loss of generality.
Proposition 2.1 Coalition S has an incentive compatible, coarse objection to
x over an event E which is common knowledge for S,i fa n do n l yi fS has an
incentive compatible, ﬁne objection to x over an (admissible) event E  which is
common knowledge for S.
Proof: Suppose y ∈ AS is an incentive compatible, coarse objection of coali-
tion S to x over a common knowledge event E.L e t E 
i = Ei = {ti ∈ Ti |
(t 
−i,t i) ∈ E for some t 
−i ∈ T−i},a n dl e tE  =
 
i∈S E 
i × T−S.O fc o u r s e ,E 
is a common knowledge event for S since E ⊆ E . Since no type is redundant,
6and E  is a common knowledge event, it follows that qi(E  | ti) > 0 for all t ∈ E 
and all i ∈ S.T h u sE  is an admissible event. Since E  is a common knowledge
event, it follows that for every i ∈ S and t ∈ E , qi(t−i | ti,E )=qi(t−i | ti).
Thus, Ui(yi | ti,E )=Ui(yi | ti). Since (D’) holds for all ti ∈ Ei = E 
i for all
i ∈ S, this implies (D). Of course, (IC’) implies (IC) over E .T h u s ,y is a ﬁne
objection by S over a common knowledge (admissible) event E .
To prove the converse, suppose y is an incentive compatible ﬁne objection by
S over E, a common knowledge, admissible event E.I fS = {i}, we can assume
without loss of generality, that yi(t)=ωi(ti) for all t ∈ T.O f c o u r s e , y then
satisﬁes (IC’) and since E is a common knowledge event, it follows that (S,y)
is an incentive compatible coarse objection. Assume, therefore, that |S|≥2.





yi(t) for all t ∈ E
0i f ti / ∈ Ei and tj ∈ Ej for all i  = j
ωi(ti)o t h e r wi s e
Note that since |S|≥2, it is possible to ﬁnd ˜ y of this form satisfying exact
feasibility, i.e., free disposal is not needed. We nowclaim that ˜ y is an incentive
compatible coarse objection by S to x over the event E.S i n c eE is a common
knowledge event, for all t ∈ E and i ∈ S,
Ui(˜ yi | ti,E)=Ui(yi | ti,E)=Ui(yi | ti).
Thus (D) implies (D’). It remains to be shown that (IC) implies (IC’). Condition
(IC) means that
Ui(˜ yi | ti) ≥ Ui(˜ yi,s i | ti) for all si,t i ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S.
Given assumption (B), and the construction of ˜ y, this also holds for all si,t i ∈ Ti.
Thus ˜ y is an incentive compatible coarse objection over E.
Proposition 2.1 shows that we can take admissibility, (D) and (IC) to be the
necessary conditions in deﬁning an objection. The coarse core adds to these
conditions the requirement that objections are only permitted over common
knowledge events. Clearly then, the incentive compatible, ﬁne core is a subset
of the incentive compatible, coarse core.
It is important to keep in mind that both (D) and (IC) are deﬁned with
respect to an admissible event E, reﬂecting the updated probability assessments
inherent in E. In particular, a ﬁne objection by S over a particular state, i.e.,
a ﬁne objection by S over an event E =
 
i∈S{ti}×T−S, makes condition
(IC) redundant. Thus a contract in the incentive compatible ﬁne core must
necessarily be ex-post eﬃcient in the sense of Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983).6
Moreover, as Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2000) show, in an atomless economy,
the ﬁne core is a subset of the ex post core, i.e., a ﬁne core allocation has
6The fact that an allocation in the ﬁne core is ex-post eﬃcient again points to the fact
that an incentive compatible, ﬁne objection may rely on an agent to believe unveriﬁable (and
unreasonable) claims by another.
7the property that in each state, the allocation is a core allocation of the full
information economy for that state.
As is well known, even in the two-consumer case, there might not exist
any incentive compatible allocation which is ex-post eﬃcient (see, for example,
Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). The
incentive compatible, ﬁne core may therefore be empty even in a two-consumer
economy.7 The incentive compatible, coarse core is non-empty in (well-behaved)
two-consumer economies. It is also generally non-empty if preferences are linear;
see Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) and Vohra (1999). However, Vohra (1999) shows
that in well-behaved, three-consumer economies (with non-linear preferences)
the incentive compatible, coarse may be empty.8
3 Credible Information Pooling
We shall argue that in some cases pooling of information is reasonable while
in others it is not. Our aim is to formalize a notion of credible pooling of
private information and a corresponding notion of a credible core. We begin
with two simple, motivating examples. The ﬁrst illustrates a situation in which
information pooling seems reasonable, and provides a critique of the coarse core.
The second illustrates a situation in which information pooling does not seem
reasonable, and provides a critique of the ﬁne core. These examples will also
serve to introduce our notion of credibility.
Example 3.1
There are three consumers in an economy with two commodities. Each con-
sumer i can be of two possible types. Let Ti = {ai,b i}. Of the eight information
states, only three arise with positive probability. These states are denoted
t1 =( a1,b 2,b 3),t 2 =( b1,a 2,b 3) t3 =( b1,b 2,a 3)
All consumers have identical priors q,wh e r e
q(t)=
 
1/3i f t ∈ T ∗ = {t1,t 2,t 3}
0o t h e r wi s e
In each state with positive probability there is exactly one consumer who is
fully informed; consumer i is the informed agent in state ti.
The consumption set of each consumer is I R
2




(1,0) if ti = bi
(0.5,0.5) if ti = ai
7Wilson (1978) constructs a three-consumer example in which the ﬁne core is empty. Recall
that Wilson did not impose incentive compatibility.
8Forges and Minelli (2000) point out that the if random allocations are permitted, then
the example in Vohra (1999) does have a non-empty ex ante core. However, Forges, Mertens
and Vohra (2001) provide another example in which the incentive compatible coarse core is
empty even if random allocations are allowed.
8For x =( x1,x 2) ∈ I R
2
+, the state-dependent utility functions are as follows.
u1(x,t)=
 
1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t3
x1 + x2 otherwise
u2(x,t)=
 
1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t1
x1 + x2 otherwise
u3(x,t)=
 
1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t2
x1 + x2 otherwise
Notice that both commodities are perfect substitutes. For a contract x let
ψ(x) denote the sum of the two commodities allocated to each consumer, i.e.,
ψi(x,t)=xi1(t)+xi2(t). It can be shown that x belongs to the incentive
compatible coarse core if and only if
ψ(x,t1)=( 1 + δ1,2−δ1,0),ψ (x,t2)=( 0 ,1+δ2,2−δ2),ψ (x,t3)=( 2 −δ3,0,1+δ3)
where δ1,δ 2,δ 3 ∈ [0,1/3].
The incentive compatible, coarse core contains in particular the allocation
¯ x(t), where
¯ x(t1) = ((0.5,0.5),(2,0),(0,0))
¯ x(t2) = ((0,0),(0.5,0.5),(2,0))
¯ x(t3) = ((2,0),(0,0),(0.5,0.5))
This allocation is not in the incentive compatible, ﬁne core.9 Consumers
1 and 3 have a ﬁne objection over the event {t1} since ψ1(¯ x,t1)+ψ3(¯ x,t1)=
1, while their aggregate endowment of the two commodities is 2. If private
information can be shared, as is implicit in the notion of the ﬁne core, then
clearly ¯ x is not viable in state t1. But, in the present example more can be said
to justify a ﬁne objection by agents 1 and 3. Suppose the state is t1,wh i c h
consumer 1 knows. Consumer 3 knows that the true state is either t1 or t2.
Consider an oﬀer from consumer 1 to consumer 3 of the full state contingent
contract ˜ x(t), where
(˜ x1(t), ˜ x3(t)) =
 
((1.1,0),(0.4,0.5)) if t = t1
(ω1(t),ω 3(t)) otherwise
In state t1, the corresponding net-trades are z1(t1)=( 0 .6,−0.5), z3(t1)=
(−0.1,0.5). In state t1, the informed agent gives up 0.5 units of commodity
2 for 0.6 units of commodity 1. Note that t1 is the only state in which her
endowments permit her to make this trade. While 3 does not know whether the
true state is t1 or t2, she does knowthat the informed agent w ould be better
oﬀ with this contract only if the true state is t1; if the state is actually t2,t h e
9In fact, it can be shown, that in this example the ﬁne core (with or without incentive
constraints) is empty. The main diﬀerence between this example and Wilson’s (1978) Example
2 is that in our example each agent’s endowment depends on his own type.
9net-trade z1(0.6,−0.5) is infeasible for agent 1. The informed agent’s claim,
that the state is t1, is credible and should, therefore, be accepted by agent 3.
Acceptance of this contract requires only that agent 3 infer (correctly) from the
contract that the state is t1, not that 1’s private information becomes explicitly
available to agent 3. In this respect this contract oﬀers a sensible objection to
the status-quo. Agents should be able to coordinate on an event that can be
inferred simply by the fact that all members of the coalition are willing to sign a
contract that is to their beneﬁt only on the given event. In the present example,
this makes it hard to justify the coarse core as the appropriate core notion.
We now give an example which shows that unlimited pooling of information,
which is implicit in the deﬁnition of the ﬁne core, may not be very appropriate
under some circumstances.
Example 3.2
Consider a simpler version of Example 3.1 in which there is only one com-
modity. The information structure is the same as before, i.e., Ti = {ai,b i)f o r
each i and T ∗ = {t1,t 2,t 3}.
The consumption set of each consumer is I R+ in each state and the endow-
ment of each consumer is 1 in each state.
The state-dependent utility functions are as follows.
u1(x,t)=
 








1.5x if t = t2
x otherwise
The incentive compatible, coarse core consists of all allocations x of the form
x(t1)=( 1+δ1,2 − δ1,0),x(t2)=( 0 ,1+δ2,2 − δ2),x (t3)=( 2+δ3,0,1+δ3)
where δ1,δ 2,δ 3 ∈ [0,1/3].
The contract ¯ x(t), where
¯ x(t1)=( 1 ,2,0), ¯ x(t2)=( 0 ,1,2), ¯ x(t3)=( 2 ,0,1)
is one such contract.
This allocation is not in the incentive compatible, ﬁne core.10 Consumers 1
and 3 have a ﬁne objection over the event {t1} with a contract ˜ x(t1) such that
˜ x1(t1)=1+  and ˜ x3(t1)=1−  for   ∈ (0,1). In fact, every ﬁne objection must
be of this form. But agent 3 cannot infer from this contract that consumer 1
is of type a1 because consumer 1 would prefer the net trade   in both states t1
and t2. Moreover, if the true state is t2, consumer 3 by agreeing to the contract
10As in example 3.1, the incentive compatible, ﬁne core is empty.
10˜ x, and accepting 1’s claim that she is of type a1, would be worse oﬀ compared
to the status-quo ¯ x. In this sense, the ﬁne objection is not credible. The same
argument holds for any ﬁne objection to a contract that belongs to the coarse
core. In this example, therefore, the coarse core seems more reasonable than
the ﬁne core.
The essential message from these examples is that the pooling of private
information between members of a coalition should be permitted only if it can
be justiﬁed as being credible. We nowdevelop a notion of objections w hich
incorporates this consideration.
Suppose each i in coalition S claims, independently, not to be of any type
ˆ ti / ∈ Ei.T h i s t y p e , ˆ ti,cannot be ruled out by agent j ∈ S, with her private
information, if
for some t ∈ E, ˆ ti / ∈ Ei, qj(t−i,ˆ ti) > 0( 3 .1)
By assumption (A), this must, of course, mean that qj(t−i,ˆ ti) > 0 for all j ∈ N.
For each i ∈ S let Vi(E) ⊆ Ti \ Ei denote the set of all ˆ ti satisfying (3.1). Of
course, if the event E is not a common knowledge event, Vi(E)  = ∅ for some
i ∈ S.
Our credibility criterion imposes the restriction that none of the types in
Vi(E) should select (or pretend) to be some type in Ei.
Given an admissible event E for coalition S deﬁne for each i ∈ S and ˆ ti ∈
Vi(E),







Note that this expression is well-deﬁned given the deﬁnition of Vi(E).
For an event admissible for coalition S, we can now deﬁne for each i ∈ S
and a type ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E), the conditional expected utility (conditional on E), of a
contract x as











Similarly, deﬁne the conditional expected utility of x to ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E)i fˆ ti pretends
to be of type si ∈ Ti as
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Note that this is well-deﬁned since ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E).
Suppose x ∈ AN, y ∈ AS and E is an admissible event for coalition S.A
contract y is said to satisfy self-selection with respect to x over E if
Ui(y,si | ˆ ti,E) ≤ Ui(x | ˆ ti,E) for all ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E), si ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S (SS).
This constraint can be seen as an extension of (IC) to those types who are
not supposed to be part of the objecting coalition. Notice that, as in (D) and
11(IC), the probabilities used in computing conditional expected utility, are those
corresponding to the event E over which the objection is supposed to take place.
By the argument used in proving proposition 2.1, it can be shown that condition
(SS) equivalent to one in which this inequality is required to hold for all si ∈ Ti
rather than for all si ∈ Ei.
Coalition S is said to have an incentive compatible, credible objection to an
incentive compatible contract x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS a n da na d m i s s i b l e
event E such that (D), (IC) and (SS) are satisﬁed.
The incentive compatible, credible core consists of all incentive compatible
allocations to which there does not exist an incentive compatible, credible ob-
jection.
The basic idea underlying our notion of the credible core is one that has
been widely used in other, related contexts. In non-cooperative models with
incomplete information it is an idea that appears in several equilibrium reﬁne-
ments; see, for example, the discussion of the intuitive criterion in Cho and
Kreps (1987).11 It is used by Kahn and Mookherjee (1995) in analyzing coali-
tion proof Nash equilibrium under incomplete information. It is also related in
spirit to the notion of durability studied by Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983),
which we will discuss in more detail in the next section. As in Forges (1994),
we focus on coalitional moves in renegotiation and abstract away from the de-
tails of an explicit non-cooperative procedure of the kind considered in some
of this related literature. While Forges (1994) considers durability of the deci-
sions resulting from a mechanism, our analysis is concerned with durability, or
credibility, of the mechanism itself.
Notice that if E is a common knowledge event for S then Vi(E)=∅ for
all i ∈ S, and (SS) is, therefore, trivially satisﬁed. Thus the credible core is a
subset of the coarse core. On the other hand, the ﬁne core is contained in the
credible core since a credible objection is a particular kind of ﬁne objection. In
example 3.1, the credible core coincides with the ﬁne core, and in example 3.2
it coincides with the coarse core. As shown by example 3.1, the credible core
can be empty. Since utility functions in that example are linear, it follows that
appealing to random allocations is not enough to establish non-emptiness.
Incentive constraints are important in the notion of the credible core. If
incentive constraints are not imposed, it is easy to see that the credible core
is identical to the ﬁne core. This is so because a ﬁne objection y over E by
coalition S is then equivalent to one in which agent i is assigned 0 in every state
t such that t−i ∈ Ei and ti ∈ Vi(E). This observation does not apply to a notion
of credibility in which instead of requiring that the wrong types lose we require
that the other (uninformed) agents gain regardless. This is the idea used by
Lee and Volij (1996) in deﬁning the coarse + core, without imposing incentive
11As in the intuitive criterion, the speech by an agent making a claim about her type is: ‘If I
am of the wrong type I would not gain over the status-quo, so you should believe me’. Think
of status-quo as the equilibrium. It can be broken if there is a way to signal information
in a credible way which would make them all better oﬀ. In the coarse core, breaking the
equilibrium is diﬃcult because it has to be common knowledge that all types are better oﬀ –
akin to elimination by domination; the credible version is like the intuitive criterion.
12constraints. More precisely, they deﬁne a coarse + objection by coalition S as
an objection over an event E which is common knowledge to a subset A of S
such that all agents in A gain in terms of conditional expected utility over the
event E, as in the deﬁnition of a coarse objection and all agents in S \ A gain
in (ex post utility) in all states. In general, the coarse + core contains the ﬁne
core and is contained in the coarse core. While our notion of credibility reduces
to the notion of ﬁne objections in the present context, it is conceptually related
to Volij (2000). Abstracting from incentive constraints, Volij (2000) proposes a
deﬁnition of the core that takes account of inferences drawn by agents based on
the acceptance of a proposal by other members of the coalition. He constructs
a sequence of reﬁnements of the information partition of each agent based on
the types of others who would gain by accepting the new proposal. The limit of
these procedure yields a newinformation partition for each player. An objection
is required to make each player better-oﬀ at each step of the sequence, as well
as in the limit. Our notion of credibility is clearly very similar to Volij’s except
that we impose a reﬁnement of the information structure directly, without going
through a sequence. The other diﬀerence is that we require improvements to be
evaluated for the ‘limit’ information sets, and we impose incentive compatibility.
4 Credibility and Bayesian Nash Equilibria of
Voting Games
As we have already pointed out, credibility is closely related in spirit to the
Holmstr¨ om-Myerson (1983) notion of durability. Holmstr¨ om and Myerson con-
struct a voting game for the grand coalition and deﬁne an incentive eﬃcient
decision rule to be durable if every alternative proposal is rejected in a sequen-
tial equilibrium of the voting game.12 In this section we formally explore the
connections between credible objections and Bayesian Nash equilibria of the
voting game considered by Holmstr¨ om and Myerson.
Consider an incentive compatible allocation x ∈ AN which is the status-
quo. By the revelation principle, x can be seen as Bayesian Nash equilibrium
outcome of the direct revelation game. Suppose coalition S is free to choose a
newmechanism y ∈ AS to be played by members of S. The newmechanism y
is to be interpreted as a competing proposal which is implemented if and only
if all members of S vote to accept y instead of x.I f a l l p l a y e r s i n S accept
y, they play a direct revelation game in which the strategy set for each i ∈ S
is Ti, and the outcome is y(t)f o rt ∈ T. In case of a rejection, the outcome
function used in the second stage is x(t). Players vote conﬁdentially, and only
the outcome of the vote is revealed publicly. Thus a voting game is deﬁned as
γ(S,y,x), in which the players are the members of S, y ∈ AS and x ∈ AN.
A truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting game is one in which each
12They consider a fully non-cooperative framework in which coordination problems are not
necessarily overcome in equilibrium. Since we are dealing with a cooperative solution, a
coalition can coordinate on an allocation provided it is self-enforcing with respect to private
information.
13player reports truthfully in stage 2 (regardless of whether or not the proposal
is accepted).
For our next result, we need one additional deﬁnition.
An allocation x ∈ AN is said to be uniformly incentive compatible if
ui(xi(t),t) ≥ ui(xi(t−i,s i),t) for all si,t i ∈ Ti, t−i ∈ T−i, for all i ∈ N.
Note that if there is only one informed agent, then this condition is equivalent
to incentive compatibility.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose x ∈ AN is incentive compatible and Γ(S,y,x) is a
voting game for coalition S. If there exists a truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
and an admissible event E, such that i accepts y if and only ti ∈ Ei,a n da l l
players in S gain compared to the status-quo whenever y is accepted, then (S,y)
is an incentive compatible credible objection to x over the event E. The converse
also holds if x is uniformly incentive compatible.
Proof: In the voting game, a strategy of player i is a mapping from Ti to
{a,r}×Ti,wh e r e a denotes acceptance and r denotes rejection of the proposal
y. We will denote by αi(ti), the action chosen by player i of type ti in stage 1,
and by γ(ti), the reported type of player i in stage 2.
Suppose there exists a truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium, σ, of the game
(S,y) such that αi(ti)=a for all ti ∈ Ei, and all players in S when y is accepted.
We claim that (S, ˜ y,E) is an incentive compatible, credible objection. The fact
that all players in E gain implies that ˜ y satisﬁes (DD) over E. Condition (SS)
follows from the fact that all players outside ES reject the proposal. Since σ is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it follows from an argument similar that used in
proving the revelation principle that y satisﬁes (IC) over E.
To prove the converse, when x satisﬁes uniform incentive compatibility, let
(S,y) be an incentive compatible, credible objection to x over the event E.
Suppose x is uniformly incentive compatible. A strategy for player i of type i
nowconsists of αi(ti) ∈{ a,r} and γi(ti,h) ∈ Ti,wh e r e h denotes the observed
history in stage 2. Let σ be a strategy proﬁle in the game Γ (S,y) such that For
each i ∈ S,
αi(ti)=
 
a if ti ∈ Ei
r if ti / ∈ Ei
γi(ti,h)=ti for all ti ∈ Ti for all h.
According to σ, a player accepts y if and only if she is of a type belonging to
Ei, and all players report their types truthfully in stage 2. By following the
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Thus (4.2) and (4.3) imply that (3.1) holds for all t 
i ∈ Ti. Using uniform
incentive compatibility of x, we can assert that
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Conditions (4.1) and (4.4) imply that
Ui(σ,| ti) ≥ Ui(σ−i,σ 
i | ti)
and the deviation cannot be proﬁtable.
To complete the proof we need to show that a deviation by a player i of type
ti / ∈ Ei cannot be proﬁtable. The equilibrium strategy proﬁle yields Ui(xi | ti)
to such a player. Since x is incentive compatible, it cannot be proﬁtable to
reject the proposal and misreport the type. Consider a deviation σ 
i in which
this player accepts in stage 1, and reports t 
i if y is played in stage 2 and si if
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15From uniform incentive compatibility of x we obtain (4.4). Together, these
conditions imply that
Ui(σ | ti)=Ui(xi | ti) ≥ Ui(σ−i,σ 
i | ti)
and a deviation is not proﬁtable. This completes the proof that the credible
deviation is sustained as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ (S,y).
The reason that uniform incentive compatibility is needed in proving the
second part of the proposition is that if y is not accepted, players may gain
information from this fact and not report truthfully in stage 2. If we consider a
simpler voting game in which x is interpreted as the status-quo and assume that
in case of a rejection, the outcome is x, then uniform incentive compatibility
can be dispensed with. It is also worthwhile to note that if E is a common
knowledge event, again uniform incentive compatibility is not needed in proving
the second part of the proposition. In other words, an incentive compatible
coarse objection can be seen as Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting game
in which y is accepted whenever t ∈ E.
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